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**A POLITICAL, IDEOLOGICAL, AND INSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS OF JAMAAT-E-ISLAMI'S INTERNAL
DISCORD AND DEFECTION WAVES**

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Summary Statement

The Chronological History of Defections from Jamaat-e-Islami
Pakistan (1941–2025) tracks key member exits over eight
decades. A Political, Ideological, and Institutional Analysis
reveals the causes of internal dissent and defection waves. From
Unity to Rift highlights major defections and ideological splits
that shaped Jamaat-e-Islami's history.

There may be fractured visions confirmed by the series of
leadership exodus, key figures departer and real timeline
mapping of exits from Jamaat-e-Islami Over Decades. The
founding vision of Jamaat-e-Islami under Abul A'la Maududi in
1941 was conceived as a revolutionary Islamic movement to
establish a Quranic state rooted in moral reform and intellectual
rigor. However, from its inception, the organization witnessed
continuous intellectual, political, and theological friction. Over
the decades, numerous prominent figures joined the Jamaat with
high expectations of religious renewal but eventually departed,
citing internal rigidity, strategic contradictions, or ideological
disillusionment. Their resignations reflect recurring conflicts

over dogmatism, hierarchy, and the tension between religious idealism and political pragmatism.

Early Intellectual Departures Exposed

Ghulam Ahmad Pervez collaborated with Maududi before 1947 but left when his Qur'an-centric rationalism clashed with Jamaat's orthodoxy and acceptance of Hadith as binding law. His departure marked the earliest intellectual fracture — between traditionalism and modernist exegesis.

Abul Hasan Ali Hasani Nadwi withdrew in the mid-1940s, rejecting Maududi's politicization of Islam. Nadwi argued that moral and spiritual revival, not political power, was Islam's primary mission, a belief that made his continuation impossible within Jamaat's emerging political framework.

Maulana Amin Ahsan Islahi, one of Jamaat's most distinguished scholars, resigned in the late 1940s after heated conflicts with Maududi regarding the political interpretation of Islam and autocratic leadership style. His departure exposed the structural weakness of intellectual centralization.

Political Pragmatists Rejected Jamaat's Revolutionary Model

Chaudhry Muhammad Ali, an early supporter and later Pakistan's Prime Minister, distanced himself post-1947 due to Jamaat's confrontational politics. He preferred pragmatic nation-building over ideological agitation.

Maulana Abdul Sattar Niazi, a Punjab-based cleric, left in the early 1950s, opposing Maududi's revolutionary approach and instead forming his own religious faction emphasizing grassroots clerical activism over organizational discipline.

The Crisis of Spiritual Leadership

Dr. Israr Ahmad, after joining in the 1950s, resigned in 1957, condemning Jamaat's participation in parliamentary politics as a "democratic compromise." His new movement, *Tanzeem-e-Islami*, represented the yearning for spiritual purity and Qur'an-centered revivalism.

Professor Naeem Siddiqui, a close literary associate of Maududi, left in the late 1950s, accusing the leadership of neglecting spiritual development and becoming bureaucratically rigid. He founded *Tehreek-e-Islami Pakistan* as a call for moral revival.

Jamaat's Identity Crisis in the 1960s

Kausar Niazi, a dynamic orator and preacher, was expelled in the mid-1960s for promoting populist religious discourse beyond Jamaat's control. His shift to *Pakistan People's Party* and later ministerial role under Bhutto symbolized ideological transformation from purism to populism.

Maulana Wahiduddin Khan left in the same decade, disillusioned by Jamaat's obsession with political power. He devoted his life to promoting peaceful propagation and intellectual dialogue, sharply criticizing Jamaat's power-centric interpretation of Islam.

Khurshid Ahmad, while remaining an intellectual pillar, quietly withdrew from active politics in the late 1960s to focus on policy research through the *Institute of Policy Studies*. His partial exit underscored the transition of many scholars from activism to intellectualism.

Post-Zia Stagnation and Doctrinal Fatigue

Syed Asad Gilani departed in the late 1970s, frustrated by Jamaat's failure to harness Zia-ul-Haq's Islamization into meaningful reform. His exit symbolized disappointment among ideologues who saw the movement's stagnation.

Dr. Rafiq Ahmed, Dr. Rafiuddin Hashmi, and Dr. Mubarak Ali left in the 1970s after conflicts over research freedom, academic censorship, and ideological rigidity. Their resignations revealed Jamaat's incapacity to accommodate academic autonomy.

Abdul Ghafoor Ahmed, a senior leader, resigned during the Bhutto regime after strategic failures in political negotiations, reflecting internal disunity and weak tactical vision.

Sectarianization and Strategic Myopia

Maulana Manzoor Ahmad Chinioti broke away in the 1980s, embracing sectarian activism and joining anti-Ahmadi movements that contrasted Jamaat's intellectual approach.

Muhammad Ali Durrani, a former IJT head, left due to organizational politics and career pragmatism, later aligning with *PML-Q* under Musharraf.

Hafiz Salman Butt, another IJT leader, was expelled for internal factionalism but continued civic activism independently.

Ahsan Iqbal transitioned from IJT to *PML-N*, seeking developmental, technocratic governance rather than ideological activism.

Javed Hashmi also departed in the late 1980s, believing in democratic pluralism over religious exclusivity, later joining *PML-N* and *PTI*.

Fragmentation of Jamaat's Urban and Regional Base

Syed Abdul Rashid and Syed Sajid Naeem, Karachi-based organizers, left citing lack of democracy, bureaucratic rigidity, and stagnation in leadership. Their exits demonstrated urban disillusionment with Jamaat's obsolete structure.

Sufi Muhammad separated in 1992 to found *Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM)*, advocating militant enforcement of Sharia — a radical reaction to Jamaat's passive politics.

Professor Khurshid Nadeem departed after ideological clashes, promoting rational Islamic discourse through media and academia.

Abdul Rasheed Turabi, from Jammu and Kashmir, drifted away in the 1990s–2000s to emphasize regional autonomy and local political engagement over centralized religious politics.

Loss of Modern Political Relevance

Ziaullah Shah, a mid-level organizer, resigned citing lack of transparency, weak electoral strategies, and failure to attract the educated middle class.

Liaquat Baloch reduced active involvement to focus on interfaith and civic initiatives, revealing internal frustration with electoral stagnation.

A broad exodus of **Islami Jamiat-e-Talaba (IJT)** alumni continued through the 2000s–2020s as younger generations rejected Jamaat's outdated methods and absence of modern political innovation.

Dr. Javed Ahmad Ghamidi, departing in the early 2000s, opposed Jamaat's coercive implementation of Islamic law and later founded *Al-Mawrid* and *Daleel*, championing rational, evidence-based Islamic interpretation.

Defined Jamaat's Final Phase (2023–2025)

Hafiz Naeem-ur-Rehman's leadership introduced digital transparency, youth mobilization, and urban governance reforms, revitalizing public visibility but alienating traditional factions that viewed his initiatives as ideological dilution.

Dr. Talat Majeed, a former J&K affiliate, joined *Apni Party* and contested independently in 2024, frustrated by Jamaat's stagnant leadership and lack of political recognition.

Sayyar Ahmad Reshi and **Talat Majid** contested 2024 elections independently, reflecting a Kashmiri shift toward pragmatic democracy over ideological isolation.

Abdul Rehman Shalla co-founded the *Justice and Development Front (JDF)* in 2025, envisioning lawful political participation post-JeI ban.

Shameem Ahmad Thokar, former JeI Kashmir member, became *JDF President* in April 2025, emphasizing legal politics and governance.

Hakim Mohammad Yasin (Hakeem Yaseen), ex-minister, aligned with *PDF–JDF coalitions* to pursue inclusive governance models beyond Jamaat's doctrinal politics.

Ghulam Mohammed Bhat, in September 2025, led a factional split within JeI remnants over internal governance, symbolizing organizational disintegration.

Mushtaq Ahmad Khan, in October 2025, resigned as Senator citing conscience and commitment to human rights, democracy, and judicial fairness — calling for institutional accountability and fair trial for Imran Khan.

Exposes Jamaat's Enduring Identity Crisis

From **Ghulam Ahmad Pervez** in the 1940s to **Mushtaq Ahmad Khan** in 2025, every resignation revealed the same structural contradiction: Jamaat's persistent failure to balance ideological purity with pragmatic adaptability. The intellectuals left seeking autonomy, the politicians left seeking relevance, and the clerics left seeking authority. Despite repeated reform efforts, the movement's rigid centralization and fear of pluralism continued to erode its internal cohesion — leaving behind a fragmented legacy of devotion, dissent, and disillusionment.

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